THEORY OF EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN FORMULATING INNOVATION STRATEGIES
Innovative activity is surrounded by uncertainty given the unpredictability that exists in the various fields of innovation, from research to social acceptance through the entire process of development and dissemination.
Given that innovating is a complex and nonrandom activity, it is necessary for firms to seek strategies for innovation aiming at an advantageous positioning in the markets where it operates. Defining how to act and position yourself is a dynamic, evolutionary process. In this sense the work will approach this process using the tools available by the evolutionary game theory since they allow us a strategy selection analysis where the less able ones are eliminated in favor of the most successful ones.
All mathematical models are limited in the sense that they encompass a limited structure of parameters. Evolutionary games have been defined because they allow a definition of limited rationality for players and allow a closer analysis of reality, thus differentiating from traditional game theory and agent-based models.
This research then begins with questions found in firms about when they should innovate and what is the need to formulate an innovation strategy to have a position in a particular market.