Banca de DEFESA: GRÉGORY AUGUSTO CARVALHO COSTA

Uma banca de DEFESA de MESTRADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
DISCENTE : GRÉGORY AUGUSTO CARVALHO COSTA
DATA : 20/09/2022
HORA: 10:00
LOCAL: Por participação remota
TÍTULO:

Scepticism and meaning: Essay on a Carnapian reassessment of the semantic paradox stated by Kripke

PÁGINAS: 101
GRANDE ÁREA: Ciências Humanas
ÁREA: Filosofia
RESUMO:

In Saul Kripke’s reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical investigations, there is an intriguing philosophical problem. Through this reading, which was exposed in Wittgenstein on rules and private language, Kripke presented a very particular type of skepticism, which became known as semantic skepticism. Notwithstanding the strangeness caused by Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein as a skeptic, his interpretation took on a life of its own and became a troublesome problem, because if semantic skepticism is true, it is not possible to construct factualists theories of meaning. This is because the basic assumption of these theories – that meanings are given by their truth conditions and reference to facts – results in a paradox: according to semantic skepticism, there are just no facts by which meanings are determined. However, if these facts do not exist, we are forced to conclude that language is not meaningful because there would be no way of knowing that such and such an expression has such and such a meaning. If one tries to offer a fact that refutes the paradox, solving it directly, the failure to respond to skeptical arguments in factual terms is shown, leaving only the appeal of a skeptical solution that accepts the terms of the paradox and seeks to offer a new way of understanding meanings that does not refer to facts. Given these theoretical coordinates, the problem of this research is to reassess semantic skepticism and show that a certain kind of factualism is still possible even in the face of the skeptical challenge. To do so, an argument will be offered that seeks to deflate the terms posed by semantic skepticism. Such efforts will be anchored on two main arguments: reinterpreting the paradox as a question that is at the same time semantic and ontological, and deflating the problem in order to demonstrate a certain meta-ontological inaccuracy of the question posed by the paradox. The theoretical basis on which this reassessment will be built is found in the theory that Carnap develops in Empiricism, semantics, and ontology. With this theory, Carnap proposes to delimit ontological questions that are legitimate and pseudo-questions without cognitive content that do not admit satisfactory solutions.

MEMBROS DA BANCA:
Presidente - Interno ao Programa - 3008866 - MATTIA PETROLO
Membro Titular - Examinador(a) Interno ao Programa - 413607 - LUIZ ANTONIO ALVES EVA
Membro Titular - Examinador(a) Externo à Instituição - MARCO ANTONIO CARON RUFFINO - UNICAMP
Membro Suplente - Examinador(a) Interno ao Programa - 1544383 - RENATO RODRIGUES KINOUCHI
Membro Suplente - Examinador(a) Externo à Instituição - PLÍNIO JUNQUEIRA SMITH - UNIFESP