Banca de QUALIFICAÇÃO: GRÉGORY AUGUSTO CARVALHO COSTA

Uma banca de QUALIFICAÇÃO de MESTRADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
DISCENTE : GRÉGORY AUGUSTO CARVALHO COSTA
DATA : 23/06/2021
HORA: 10:00
LOCAL: por participação remota
TÍTULO:

Scepticism and meaning: Essay of a carnapian response to the semantic paradox stated by Kripke

PÁGINAS: 114
GRANDE ÁREA: Ciências Humanas
ÁREA: Filosofia
RESUMO:

In Saul Kripke's reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations there is an intriguing philosophical problem. By this reading, which is stated in Wittgenstein on rules and private language, Kripke presented a very particular type of scepticism, which became known as semantic scepticism. Notwithstanding the awkwardness caused by Kripke having read Wittgenstein as a sceptic, his interpretation took on a life of its own and became an uncomfortable problem, because if semantic scepticism is true, there isn't any theory of meaning that can be true. The basic assumption of classical theories of meaning – that meanings are given by their truth conditions and reference to facts – results in a paradox: there are just no facts by which meanings are determined. However, if these facts do not exist, we are forced to conclude that language is meaningless, because there would be no way to know that such and such an expression has such and such a meaning. In fact, there are two types of possible answers to be thrown against this paradox: through a direct solution, by which the existence of facts that would refute the sceptical argument is demonstrated, and via a sceptical solution, which accepts the terms put forward and recognizes the impossibility of solving the paradox directly, but it offers a new way of understanding meanings that does not refer to facts. For Kripke, all attempts of direct solution fail. Therefore, the problem of this research is to discuss the possibility of objecting semantic scepticism within a factual theoretical framework. So, a possible deflationary solution will be offered as a result of a revaluation of sceptical questioning. Such efforts will be anchored on two reference parameters: to reinterpret semantic scepticism as a question that is both semantic and ontological, so that it can deflate the problem and demonstrate the metaontological and even semantic impropriety of the question posed by the paradox. The theoretical bases on which this deflationary solution will be built are found in the theories that Carnap develops mainly in two works: Empiricism, semantics, and ontology, a work in which there is a metaontological theory that proposes to delimit the ontological questions that are legitimate; and Meaning and necessity, a work in which there is a factualist theory of meaning based on a deflationary conception of ‘fact’.

MEMBROS DA BANCA:
Presidente - Interno ao Programa - 2067640 - LORENZO BARAVALLE
Membro Titular - Examinador(a) Interno ao Programa - 413607 - LUIZ ANTONIO ALVES EVA
Membro Titular - Examinador(a) Externo à Instituição - MARCO ANTONIO CARON RUFFINO - UNICAMP
Membro Suplente - Examinador(a) Interno ao Programa - 3087514 - MAURIZIO ESPOSITO
Membro Suplente - Examinador(a) Externo à Instituição - PLÍNIO JUNQUEIRA SMITH - UNIFESP