The Securitization of Terrorism in The United States: Success, Failure and the Audiences in the Securitizing moves of Clinton and Bush
After the 9/11 attacks, it is possible to identify a change in terrorism policies in the USA. In previous years, despite the occurrence of attacks in the country and against embassies abroad, harder laws proposed by the Clinton government (1993-2001) were rejected and considered authoritarian. That changed in 2001 and it was explored in president George W. Bush (2001-2009) and his staff’s speeches to disseminate a feeling of insecurity, asking for extraordinary executive and law-enforcement powers to address the proclaimed War on Terror, which was granted with broad popular, legislative and international support. We consider this situation offers sufficient material conditions to empirically apply the “framework for analysis” of the Securitization Theory by Buzan et al (1998). Securitizing an issue consists of its social construction as a security matter through a speech act made by an actor requiring emergency powers, which must be consented by a relevant audience. A preliminary reading of the bibliography points, however, that there are several parts of the theory left ambiguous or marginally explored by the Copenhagen School authors, such as the role of the audience and how it consents to securitization, or why some processes fail. Knowing that, it is our intention, based on the case studies of attempts to securitize terrorism in the USA, to test an analysis that gathers the original concepts of the theory to critics’ suggestions, offering solutions to study the audiences and failed securitizations.