AN ESSENTIAL TENSION IN HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY: CIRCUMSCRIBING THE “HUMAN”, LIFE AND THE ANIMAL
The text of this qualification discusses and maps the terrain of the discussion of life and animality in Martin Heidegger's philosophy during the 1920s. This part of the work in progress corresponds to the exposition of the methodology of hermeneutic phenomenology and its difficulties with the treatment of beings alive. To do this, I approach the origins of this proposal with the author's initial courses, still as an assistant to Edmund Husserl, in which his main methodological aspects are developed, such as the formal indication, the phenomenological destruction and the outline of what is called an “anthropology”. phenomenologically radical” that later culminates in Being and Time. We then consider the combination of Wilhelm Dilthey's hermeneutic elements and Husserlian phenomenology to show Heidegger's originality and heritage. At the end of this first part, we point out the gaps that arise in his philosophy with regard to living beings and that shows the thread through which we can read a threat to the fundamental ontology that will have to be faced in the course of 1929/1930, which corresponds to the second unwritten part of this dissertation.